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of the last 20 years (Fig. 2). With the advent of the 
Moon presidency, South Korea has now experienced 
its third peaceful transfer of power between oppo-
sition and government, following the election of the 
liberal Kim Dae-jung in 1997 and the right-wing con-
servative Lee Myung-bak in 2008 – one of the occur-
rences that political scientists consider a key sign of 
democratic consolidation. This election does indeed 
seem to be continuing that trend in South Korea.
President Park brings about her own downfall
Strictly speaking, this was a by-election made neces-
sary by the impeachment of the previous president, 
the conservative Park Geun-hye, who was forced from 
offi  ce on March 10, 2017. Park is the daughter of mili-
tary dictator Park Chung-hee, who came to power in a 
putsch in 1961 and who ruled until 1979 when he was 
assassinated by the man he had appointed to lead the 
country’s intelligence agency. Park Geun-hye narrowly
The presidential election that took place in South Korea 
on May 9, 2017, produced a clear winner. The Demo-
cratic Party candidate, Moon Jae-in, received 41.1 percent 
of the vote, thus becoming the country’s 19th presi-
dent (Fig. 1). With that, he defeated his most formida-
ble opponent, Hong Jun-pyo, the conservative candidate 
representing the Liberty Korea Party. At 24.0 percent, 
Hong received 5.6 million fewer votes. That is the 
largest diff erence between the top candidates in a 
presidential election since South Korea’s democrati-
zation in 1987.  
A total of 15 candidates ran for offi  ce – the most that 
Korea has ever seen in a presidential race. Voter par-
ticipation was 77.2 percent, higher than for any election 
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Figure 1: Election results, top fi ve 
candidates (in %)  
won the 2012 presidential election, receiving only 3.6 
percent more votes than Moon Jae-in, who was running 
as the opposition candidate for the fi rst time. 
 
That presidential election was overshadowed by fraud 
perpetrated by parts of the security apparatus and 
military. Once Park took offi  ce in 2013, it quickly became 
clear how unsuited she was to govern the country. 
Newspaper editors were put under pressure, people
loyal to the ruling government were installed as the 
directors of media outlets, charges were brought against 
a Japanese journalist for “slandering” the president, 
and artists critical of the government were blacklisted.
Demonstrations were in some cases forbidden or 
blocked, and demonstrators were seriously injured with 
water cannons. There was even one fatal victim.  
Park’s responses to investigations of election fraud, 
the outbreak of the MERS virus, the Sewol capsizing 
and the introduction of the THAAD missile defense 
system were mostly unprofessional and undemocratic.
Her decisions to ban the trade union for teachers and 
the left-wing United Progressive Party were question-
able at best. Park had promised to democratize the 
economy and improve social welfare benefi ts, but in-
stead promoted deregulation at every turn and took 
a passive stance regarding the ever-growing gap be-
tween rich and poor (income inequality, etc.).
In terms of foreign policy, she began moving in the 
wrong direction, namely backwards. The so-called 
Trust Policy designed to engage with North Korea 
soon proved to be the opposite, in that demands were 
made for North Korea to normalize relations and con-
ditions were imposed that Pyongyang could not fulfi ll 
without jeopardizing its own existence. The result was 
a further worsening of the already frosty relations be-
tween the two countries, which in turn led to increas-
ingly belligerent rhetoric soon followed by the closing 
of the Kaesong special economic zone.
At the same time, the Park administration aligned itself 
even further with the interests of the United States,
which under President Barack Obama had begun pursu-
ing a passive-aggressive policy of “strategic patience,” 
thus contributing to the worsening of relations. Be-
cause of its decision to make itself even more depen-
dent on the US, South Korea consequently lost the op-
portunity to play a leading role in the region and, above 
all, pursue a forward-looking policy towards North Ko-
rea. At the end of Park’s time in offi  ce, moreover, the 
US stationed its controversial THAAD missile defense 
system in South Korea – which only further worsened 
the political climate in the region, since the system can 
also be used to spy on China, which Beijing views as a 
provocation and which therefore weighs on the rela-
tionship between the two countries. 
As for its policy towards Japan, the Park government 
pursued a zigzag course. During her fi rst months in 
offi  ce, President Park distanced herself from Japanese 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at international gatherings, 
even avoiding eye contact, only to reach an agreement 
with Japan in December 2015 without consulting either
Korea’s parliament or the public. The subject of the 
agreement was releasing the Japanese government from 
blame for the forced prostitution of Korean women by 
the Japanese military in the Second World War and 
restitution for the victims. The women themselves were 
not included in the decision-making process and the 
Source: Korean National Election Commission  
(www.nec.go.kr).
 Moon Jae-in 
 Hong Jun-pyo
 Ahn Cheol-su
 Yoo Seung-min
 Sim Sang-jung
 Other
Candidates
41.1
21.4
24.0
6.8
6.2
3 
Asia PolicyBrief | June 2017
Figure 2: Voter participation in presidential 
elections 1987–2017 (in %) 
Japanese succeeded in formulating the agreement in 
such a way that, if and when it comes into eff ect, it 
would bring the countries’ confl ict of many years to a 
“fi nal and irrevocable” end.
When it was gradually revealed in autumn of 2016 that 
the president was involved in instances of corruption
and coercion and in the leaking of government secrets, 
and that her friend Choi Soon-sil had been allowed to 
participate in government and personnel decisions,
the public fi nally began to express the discontent that
had been building for years. Over the course of months,
hundreds of thousands of people – later millions – took
to the streets on weekends to demand that the presi-
dent resign. A parliamentary committee and the public
prosecutor’s offi  ce – and later a special prosecutor –
began investigating Park’s actions. The pressure on 
her continued to grow to such an extent that a ma-
jority of the country’s political parties, including 
members of Park’s own ruling party, felt compelled 
to begin proceedings in parliament to remove the 
president from offi  ce. 
The Constitutional Court ultimately upheld the im-
peachment, which resulted in Park losing her political 
immunity and cleared the way for the public pros-
ecutor to press charges. Since then Park has been 
detained and must appear multiple times each week 
at court dates, during which a total of 18 charges are 
being addressed.
Old patterns, new president
South Korea’s election law states that when the coun-
try’s highest offi  ce is vacated, the prime minister 
temporary administers the government’s aff airs and a 
new election must be held within 60 days. During the 
presidential election that took place at the beginning of 
May, typical voting patterns became apparent among 
the country’s electorate – regional preferences, in par-
ticular. While the liberal Moon did well primarily in the 
southwestern, liberal region of Honam (Gwangju and 
South and North Jeolla), the conservative, right-wing 
Hong received a majority of the votes in the tradition-
ally conservative Yeongnam region (Busan, Daegu and 
South and North Gyeongsang) in the country’s south-
east (Fig. 3). The exceptions were Busan, the city in 
which Moon has spent most of his life, and Daegu. And 
even if these regional patterns were not as pronounced 
as in the past, their impact remains as strong as ever.
The conservatives had been weakened by the scandal
involving their president, which is why many were 
surprised that the conservative, right-wing candidate 
Hong Jun-pyo, who likes to compare himself – and 
to some extent, deservedly so – with Donald Trump 
and to act like his American counterpart, managed to 
place second by gaining 24.0 percent of the vote. This 
is hardly surprising, however, since, on the one hand, 
a cohort of extremist thinkers exists in every country
and, on the other, conservative voters fell in line 
behind Hong even if they were less than enthusiastic
about him, since they feared the crisis among the 
country’s conservatives would result in their losing 
Source: Korean National Election Commission 
(www.nec.go.kr).
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any chance of being part of the government. Moreover, 
due to their lackluster performance during the elec-
tion campaign, the more moderate conservative can-
didates Yu Seung-min and Ahn Cheol-soo seemed to 
have little real chance of success. 
In addition to regional patterns, age-group-related 
patterns were also apparent (Fig. 4). Above all, voters 
aged 60 and older have always tended to vote for con-
servative candidates, which has to do with their expe-
riences, direct or indirect, of the Korean War. Another 
well-established pattern is that people with lower
levels of education tend to vote for conservative, right-
wing politicians. During the recent presidential elec-
tion, this pattern can be indirectly seen when the 
results are compared to monthly salaries, even if the 
diff erences are not large (Fig. 5). 
Overall, however, Moon was able to attract consider-
ably more votes since the public’s experience with the 
last two conservative governments – in particular, the 
scandal-ridden way the last one came to an end – had 
made a correspondingly negative impression on voters.
Moon was at an advantage when compared to the mo-
derate candidate Ahn Cheol-soo, since he has more 
extensive political experience, not to mention more 
networks and more ideas. In addition, he seemed more 
convincing during his appearances before the public, 
which in turn made him seem more trustworthy. 
In terms of content, Moon’s program seemed to best 
refl ect the zeitgeist as well. According to surveys car-
ried out on the day of the election, most of the respon-
dents said that reuniting the country’s divided society 
and fi ghting corruption were the two most signifi cant 
overall problems that the new government needed to 
address. More specifi cally, the survey’s respondents 
said that the most pressing issue requiring attention 
was, by far, stimulating the economy and creating jobs 
(53.2%), followed by political reforms aff ecting the 
constitution (13.0%), improving relations with North 
Korea (10.5%), diplomatic relations with the US and 
China (10.4%) and the topics of social welfare and the 
redistribution of social goods (9.4%).
President Moon Jae-in
Moon Jae-in was born in 1953 on the island of Geoje 
near the port city of Busan in the country’s southeast. 
Figure 3: Election results by province (major cities and provinces)
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His family had been evacuated from the country’s 
north during the Korean War and subsequently found 
itself living in adverse conditions. Yet his performance 
in school, above all, provided the young Moon with 
career opportunities. In the 1970s he studied law at 
Kyung Hee University in Seoul and passed his state 
examinations, allowing him to become a lawyer and 
civil servant. His goal was to become a judge, a career 
path he was excluded from since he had taken part 
in demonstrations during the military dictatorship 
of Park Chung-hee and had spent time in jail. He de-
cided to work as a lawyer, which is how in the early 
1980s he met Roh Moo-hyun, who was later to be 
elected president as a liberal candidate. Moon worked 
with Roh in the same legal practice where he primar-
ily took on cases involving human rights violations or 
represented workers in legal disputes. 
The two men got on so well – not only professionally,
but also personally and in terms of their political
views – that during his presidency Roh appointed Moon 
to serve as chief of staff  in the Offi  ce of the President. 
In contrast to Roh, who had already begun his politi-
cal career at the end of the 1980s as a member of par-
liament, this was Moon’s fi rst practical experience in 
the world of politics. After Roh left offi  ce, Moon spent 
two years leading the Roh Moo-hyun Memorial Foun-
dation and only reentered politics when he became 
chairman of the largest opposition party and, in 2012, 
its candidate for president. 
His fi ve years in the Offi  ce of the President and his fi ve 
years leading the opposition are valuable capital upon 
which Moon was able to draw as he mounted his sec-
ond campaign for president and which will continue 
to serve him well as he commences his current term 
of offi  ce. This is true, above all, since it aff ords him 
a critical view of both the mistakes made during the 
conservative governments of the past nine years and 
the failures of the preceding liberal governments.
Symbolic acts and government leadership
Since taking offi  ce, President Moon has spent his time 
mostly revamping governance structures and carry-
ing out a number of symbolic political acts. One of 
his fi rst directives was to have the song Imeul wihan 
haengjingok (March for the Beloved) played as an offi  cial 
hymn at the ceremony commemorating the Gwangju 
Uprising of 1980. The song had been prohibited for 
nine years by conservative governments since, to this 
day, right-wing conservatives maintain that the up-
rising in Gwangju was instigated by North Korean sol-
diers in order to cause chaos within the country. 
During his speech at the memorial ceremony on May 
18, Moon repeated his promise to include the spirit of 
the Gwangju Uprising in the preamble to the con-
stitution once it is revised. Moreover, the president 
has demonstrated that he is in touch with the people 
and their concerns. At press conferences he answers 
journalists’ questions with deliberation and care, 
he speaks on the street with members of the public, 
he embraces those in mourning at commemorative 
events and has commented empathetically on online re-
ports about searching for bodies following the sinking 
of the Sewol ferry in April 2014, during which more 
than 300 people perished.    
What is also new is that Moon has appointed a rela-
tively large number of women to high-level posts. For 
example, Jo Hyun-ok is now serving as the executive 
secretary for human resources management in the Of-
fi ce of the President, the fi rst time that a woman has 
held that position. Moon also appointed a woman, Pi 
Woo-jin, to head the traditionally conservative Min-
istry for Patriots and Veterans. As his government’s 
new foreign minister, moreover, he appointed Moon 
Kang Kyung-wha, who previously served as the UN’s 
assistant secretary-general and its emergency aid 
coordinator. A Democratic Party representative, Kim 
Hyun-mee, has been assigned head of the Ministry for 
Land, Infrastructure and Transport. Kim Eun-kyung, an 
expert on sustainable development and preservation, 
has been put forward as the new environment minister, 
and Chung Hyun-back, history professor and leading 
fi gure in the civil society movement regarding mat-
ters of gender inequality and labor disparity, has been 
designated as the new head of the Ministry of Gender 
Equality and Family. With Park Choon-ran and Lee 
Sook-jin having been appointed deputy ministers for 
education and gender respectively, the share of female 
members of Moon’s cabinet is very close to the 30 per-
cent he promised during his campaign.
Moon also nominated Constitutional Court Justice Kim 
Yi-su to fi ll the vacant post of president of the Con-
stitutional Court. In 2014, Kim was the only justice to 
speak out against the decision made in the case, intro-
duced by the conservative government, to prohibit the 
leftist United Progressive Party. In a statement he issued 
6  
Asia PolicyBrief | June 2017
in conjunction with the decision to remove President 
Park Geun-hye from offi  ce, he emphasized the severi-
ty of her infractions. Like the new prime minister, Lee 
Nak-yeon, Kim is originally from the Honam region, 
which has traditionally been underrepresented in the 
political and business spheres, and his appointment 
can undoubtedly be seen as an attempt to implement 
a regionally balanced staffi  ng policy. As of now, Moon 
seems to be fairly successful in appointing key personnel 
evenly from the regions of Yeongnam, Honam and the 
Seoul metropolitan area with about 30 percent each.
The disproportionate high share of about 43 percent
of graduates from the country’s top university, Seoul 
National University, in the new administration leaves 
room for improvement on the matter of balanced per-
sonnel policy. Overall, however, it is clear that Pres-
ident Moon is making his staffi  ng decisions based on 
three main criteria: professionalism, diversity and a 
desire to carry out reforms. The success of this staffi  ng 
policy depends, however, not only on the qualifi cations 
of the people nominated, but on the opposition’s will-
ingness to cooperate during the parliamentary confi r-
mation hearings.
Labor market and energy/ environmental policy
According to the OECD’s Better Life Index, South Ko-
rea’s scores in the areas of income distribution, work-
life balance, health, life satisfaction and the environ-
ment are considerably lower than the OECD average. 
As a result, President Moon is carrying out a number 
of employment-related programs, for example to cre-
ate 810,000 jobs in the public sector, in particular as a 
way of reducing the unemployment rate among young 
people, which is currently over 10 percent. In addition, 
he wants to reduce the offi  cial work week from 68 
hours to 52 hours and replace temporary and limited-
term work contracts with permanent contracts. He also 
wants to introduce quotas at private-sector businesses
for hiring young people while also providing the busi-
nesses with incentives to do so. Moreover, he plans to 
raise the minimum wage from €5 to €8, drastically re-
duce tuition at universities and make childcare aff ordable. 
Moon also wants to halt South Korea’s use of nuclear
power and reduce its reliance on coal-fi red power 
plants while expanding its use of renewable energies. 
Two ageing coal-fi red plants have already been shut 
down; the work on two nuclear power plants still under 
construction is to be stopped and the antiquated Wol-
song nuclear plant taken offl  ine completely. The rele-
vant authorities are currently checking to see wheth-
er and how the programs for straightening rivers and 
building dams, which were commenced under Presi-
dent Lee Myung-bak and repeatedly criticized by ex-
perts as environmentally destructive, can be reversed.
The Sisyphean challenge of chaebol reform
Moon promised to create a political system and society 
that are fair and just and an economy that is democratic,
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something he wants to achieve by combating cor-
ruption and reforming the conglomerates (chaebol) 
that dominate the business sector. He has therefore 
convened an oversight commission (cheongyeomwi), 
whose main responsibility is evaluating, developing 
and implementing policies, regulations and further 
education programs capable of combating corruption. 
In addition, more protection is to be given to whistle-
blowers, the use of juries is to be made obligatory in 
the most egregious cases of corruption, and a system-
atic process is to be introduced that allows individual 
citizens to take legal steps against government insti-
tutions that have misused or wasted tax revenues. 
The eff orts to reform the country’s conglomerates 
include requirements to increase transparency in cor-
porate governance, and regulations that will prevent 
excessive infl uence from being exerted on corporate 
leaders by members of an enterprise’s founding fam-
ily. For example, cross-shareholding is to be limited, 
something which has made it possible until now for 
family patriarchs to dictate how a company is run 
despite only formally owning 5 percent of all shares. 
In terms of holding companies, conditions and reg-
ulations are to be made more stringent and the min-
imum number of shares increased. These measures 
are designed to eliminate the byzantine structures 
that make it possible for founding families to exert de 
facto control over a company, even though this is not 
permitted de jure and, at least to outward appearanc-
es, does not seem to be the case. In addition, it will be 
possible for small shareholders to initiate class action 
lawsuits. The president’s ability to grant amnesty 
when an economic crime has been committed is also 
to be severely reduced. Moreover, the new president 
intends to use the restructured Fair Trade Commis-
sion (gongjeongwi) to prevent the exploitation of 
small and midsized companies by the conglomerates. 
Despite fi erce protest by the conservative opposition 
parties that traditionally are closer to big business, 
Moon has appointed business professor Kim Sang-jo, 
one of the most outspoken critics of the conglomer-
ates, to lead the agency. Harsher penalties that would 
prove painful even to the major conglomerates are 
also planned.
Political reforms – Constitution and 
public prosecutors
Moon’s plan is to reform the country’s presidency so 
that, in contrast to current practice, the president can 
be reelected following a fi rst four-year term, as is the 
case in the US. The objective is to reduce the lame-duck 
phase that occurs at the end of the president’s single 
fi ve-year term by introducing the prospect of another 
term of offi  ce, thereby increasing motivation. Govern-
ment programs, which by their very nature must take 
a longer-term view, would also become more realistic
and sustainable. For these changes to be implemented,
however, the constitution would have to be amended,
which requires approval by a two-thirds majority in 
parliament and subsequent approval by two-thirds of 
the electorate in a national referendum. The chances
of these hurdles being overcome are not bad at the 
moment, since all fi ve of the major candidates expressed 
support for such a reform in the run-up to the election.
A key point on Moon’s agenda is the reform of the 
public prosecutor’s offi  ce. Following democratization 
and during the subsequent liberal governments, the 
police, military and state security agencies were grad-
ually made more democratic. The public prosecutor’s 
offi  ce, however, remained largely untouched and thus 
enjoys disproportionate power and infl uence. Prose-
cutors can launch investigations and terminate them 
again without answering to another public authority. 
They have their own judicial police force at their dis-
posal and have the authority to issue directives to all 
other law enforcement offi  cials, who are legally bound 
to cooperate. 
Public prosecutors have the exclusive right to press 
charges. The public prosecutor’s offi  ce is centrally 
organized, with the minister of justice at the top of a 
highly hierarchical pyramid. In terms of international 
peers, almost no other government prosecutor enjoys 
the abundance of power that South Korean prosecutors 
do, with the exception of those in Russia. The result is 
corruption within the public prosecutor’s offi  ce. More-
over, prosecutors intimidate politicians, business lead-
ers and public offi  cials by launching investigations, or 
refuse to press charges when that would be warranted.
A more aggressive system of public prosecution 
based on the German model was introduced in Korea 
at the beginning of the 20th century during colonial 
rule by the Japanese. For years it proved eff ective as 
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an instrument of power wielded on behalf of authori-
tarian regimes. Unfortunately, even after the country’s 
democratization, public prosecutors proved helpful to 
many presidents by exerting illicit pressure under the 
guise of ensuring “law and order.” Their extensive ju-
risdiction during investigations makes public prose-
cutors virtually unassailable, even in instances where 
they violate the law, since only a public prosecutor 
– and not, for example, the police – can open a case 
against another public prosecutor. 
Wanting to keep his election promise and achieve 
meaningful change, Moon is attempting to contain 
the extensive power enjoyed by the country’s pub-
lic prosecutors by introducing democratic controlling 
mechanisms into the system. An oversight offi  ce for 
examining cases of corruption by high-level civil ser-
vants (gongsucheo) is to be created, which will have 
the authority to monitor judges and other prominent 
offi  ce holders – above all, public prosecutors – and, 
when necessary, instigate legal proceedings against 
them. Moreover, the police are to be given some of the 
authority to launch investigations currently granted
public prosecutors. This would add another degree of
democratic oversight to the system. Finally, no ex-
change of personnel is to take place in the future be-
tween the public prosecutor’s offi  ce and the Ministry 
of Justice to which it reports, since in the past this 
situation was repeatedly used to thwart any eff ective 
oversight of public prosecutors. In addition, the Moon 
administration plans to introduce an enhanced public 
defender system (hyeongsa gongongbyeonhoin jedo) to 
off er legal aid to low-income citizens in criminal cases 
starting with the investigation phase, a service the ex-
isting state-hired attorneys cannot provide, thus better 
protecting citizens’ human rights vis-à-vis prosecutors.
Oversight of the Ministry of Justice and the pub-
lic prosecutor’s offi  ce currently rests with the director 
of civil aff airs in the Offi  ce of the President. President 
Moon has appointed Cho Kuk to this position, a profes-
sor of criminal law at the National University in Seoul 
and a vocal critic of public prosecutors. His appointment 
of Yoon Seok-yeol to head the general prosecutor’s 
offi  ce in Seoul also demonstrates Moon’s determi-
nation to follow through on his election promises. 
Yoon was appointed special prosecutor to investigate 
fraud during the 2012 presidential election, but was soon 
removed from his post as retribution for having brought 
evidence to light incriminating the Park government. 
In the future, NIS (gukjeongwon), the national intel-
ligence agency, will only be authorized to carry out 
investigations abroad and will no longer be able to 
collect information of any sort within South Korea 
itself. The goal is to avoid abuses of power like those 
that have repeatedly been seen in the past. Moreover, 
the national human rights commission is to be given 
more power and will issue a report to the president on 
a regular basis.
Moon’s special envoys and the revival of
 diplomatic relations
In terms of foreign policy, in his fi rst month in offi  ce 
Moon succeeded in engineering a change of course 
with the country’s most important partners by send-
ing special envoys to the US, China, Japan, the EU 
(Germany) and Russia only one week after becoming 
president. During talks in Washington, the Trump Ad-
ministration assured Hong Seok-hyun, the special en-
voy to the US, that it was interested in continuing its 
close relationship with South Korea. It also said it did 
not want to attack North Korea or implement regime 
change there. 
During his state visit to China, Special Envoy Lee Hae-
chan was informed by the Chinese government that it 
is interested in normalizing relations and will take the 
necessary steps to that end. One of the main points 
of contention is the stationing of the THAAD missile 
defense system in South Korea, and Moon wants par-
liament to decide on the system’s future deployment. 
China is not only South Korea’s largest trading part-
ner by far, it also plays a key role geopolitically given 
the issue of North Korea. 
Japan, too, signaled to South Korea’s special envoy, 
Moon Hee-sang, that it was interested in reconcili-
ation. A number of issues on which the two nations 
have had major diff erences of opinion – the agree-
ment for compensating the so-called “comfort wom-
en”, historical misrepresentations in Japanese school 
textbooks and the territorial confl ict in the East Sea 
– are now to be treated in a forward-looking manner. 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has supported President 
Moon’s position of addressing the issue of North Korea 
together with the US and Japan, while also entering 
into direct dialogue with North Korea in order to im-
prove relations and reduce potential risks in the region. 
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In Russia, Special Envoy Song Young-kil suggested re-
viving the plan for laying a gas pipeline across Siberia to 
South Korea which was shelved by South Korea’s con-
servative governments. For the current government, this 
project off ers the opportunity of bringing North Korea 
onboard economically and, at the same time, expanding 
South Korea’s available energy supplies. 
In terms of the European Union, Special Envoy Cho 
Yoon-jae was assured by the Europeans that they 
would be willing to participate in eff orts to resolve 
the nuclear question on the Korean Peninsula, even if 
President of the European Council Donald Tusk made 
no concrete promises in this regard. Korea, in turn, is 
interested in benefi tting from the experience the EU 
gained during the nuclear talks with Iran. The meet-
ing with German Chancellor Angela Merkel was also 
very positive, as she expressed great interest in having 
even closer ties to South Korea. Other issues, including 
free trade agreements, economic cooperation, eff orts 
to combat terrorism, and climate policies, were also 
discussed during most of the talks with the special en-
voys, even if North Korea was often the focal point. 
North Korea – Sunshine Policy 3.0
Moon Jae-in’s North Korea policy does not diff er greatly 
from Kim Dae-jung’s and Roh Moo-hyun’s. In some 
respects, however, it is an updated third version. The 
biggest diff erence from the previous conservative gov-
ernments and their hardliners is that no demands for 
a dialogue or summit are being made that North Ko-
rea cannot fulfi ll. Beginning a conversation is Moon’s 
primary concern, something that shall, consequently, 
be decoupled from ideological attitudes, even those 
present in South Korea. For Moon, the key factor for 
improving relations is continuing the positive achieve-
ments of past governments, such as the joint statement 
of the 1970s, the reconciliation agreement of the early 
1990s and the joint declaration made during the Kim 
Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments. 
The idea is to sign an agreement that has again been 
ratifi ed by the national parliaments of both countries 
as a way of increasing the predictability and stability 
of inter-Korean politics. Moreover, this would create a 
legally binding foundation that would remain even as 
governments change. On the South Korean side, this 
process of developing and improving the country’s 
North Korea policy foresees an active role for civil 
society in addition to the one played by the national 
parliament. The goal is to achieve a consensus and 
Figure 5: Election results by income (monthly salary  in euros) 
Source: Joint survey carried out at polling stations by TV broadcasters KBS, MBC and SBS.
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active support within society to ensure the policy is 
sustainable.
The Moon administration wants to take its initial 
steps towards reconciliation by reaching agreement 
with North Korea on a number of issues in the civil-
ian realm, including reuniting families that have been 
separated, joint use of water resources in the border 
area, joint eff orts to combat malaria, and participation 
by North Korean athletes in the 2018 Winter Olympics 
in Pyeongchang, South Korea. Public administrators in 
provinces bordering North Korea and businesses oper-
ating there are also to be allowed to actively cooper-
ate with their counterparts to the north. Moreover, 
Moon has proposed creating an economic community 
in the areas of production, consumer goods and ex-
ports. To that end, the Kaeseong Industrial Complex 
is to be reopened as soon as possible and signifi cantly 
expanded in the future. It will then become part of the 
still-to-be-developed West Sea economic belt, which 
would make use of the existing western rail connection 
(which could theoretically be extended to Beijing) to 
connect the Seoul metropolitan area with Kaesong and 
Pyongyang, and the Sinuiju special economic zone. 
A rail connection also exists to the east and together 
with the tourist complex in North Korea’s Geumgang 
mountains, which is to be reopened, the economic belt 
is to extend via the Naseon special economic zone to 
Russia. The biggest challenge here is that the UN has 
imposed sanctions on North Korea and further sanc-
tions are planned, to which South Korea must adhere 
by, among other things, seeing to it that North Korea 
does not profi t economically.
Parallel to proactive rapprochement achieved by de-
coupling political issues from shared civil and econom-
ic projects, Moon sees the need for a robust defense 
mechanism in the form of a kill-chain antimissile sys-
tem which South Korea would develop as an eff ective 
means of protecting itself against low-fl ying missiles 
and aircraft. At the same time, North and South Korea 
Figure 6: Political parties in the national parliament 
(as of May 28, 2017; number of seats) 
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are to introduce a joint military management system
in order to prevent potential misunderstandings and 
mishaps. In addition, Moon wants South Korea to re-
gain wartime operational control (OPCON) over its 
armed forces, which is now held by the US, so that the 
country can made its own decisions in case of war. 
This, however, does not signify a withdrawal from 
the country’s alliance with the US. On the contrary, 
the Moon administration continues to see Washington 
as the most important guarantor of the country’s se-
curity. At the same time, it would like more autonomy 
for South Korea to address issues in the region. It is 
thus seeking a partnership among equals. Its declared 
goal is to ensure that North Korea suspends its nucle-
ar weapons program and, ultimately, abandons it. By 
combining dialogue-driven rapprochement with sanc-
tions, the country ultimately hopes to sign an agree-
ment that would bring peace to the Korean Peninsula. 
Conclusion
The program of reforms put forward by President 
Moon Jae-in is very ambitious. Even if he were to 
achieve in his fi ve-year term of offi  ce only half of 
what he has proposed, it would be a major step to-
wards creating a free, democratic and fair society. One 
of the biggest political challenges, however, is govern-
ing with only a minority of representatives in the na-
tional parliament (40%; see Figure 6). By relying on 
a minority government, Moon runs the risk that the 
opposition will block key reforms in order to protect 
its own or others’ interests and/or simply to make 
the new president’s job more diffi  cult. In the fi rst two 
months of his term, President Moon has already faced 
severe obstruction by the conservative opposition 
parties who are attempting to prevent reformist can-
didates from being appointed to government posts. 
As a result, Moon has to work with some of the pre-
ceding conservative administration’s ministers. Due to 
the delayed appointment of the new foreign minister, 
he has also had to wait almost two months since his 
inauguration to begin replacing the nation’s overseas 
ambassadors, changes that are taking place during 
important diplomatic exchanges with key countries. 
Given the gridlock in the national assembly, neither 
the revised supplementary budget (chugyeong) nor 
the new Government Organization Act (jeongbujojik-
peop) have been adopted, both of which are crucial 
preconditions for the implementation of Moon’s re-
form program. 
While the main role of opposition parties indeed is 
to question the incumbent government and hold it 
accountable to the public, this has to happen in an ap-
propriate manner, that is, in a way that does not obs-
truct the government per se and from the very begin-
ning. The government should be given the chance to 
demonstrate whether it is willing and able to perform. 
In this regard, the regional elections in June 2018 will, 
at the latest, serve as a fi rst barometer showing the 
degree to which the new administration has been able 
to implement the desired reforms. In general, howe-
ver, the prospects for the country under the Moon 
government are promising compared to what would 
have been the case had one of the other candidates 
been elected president.
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